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The contribution that collective bargaining has made to American society has
been well-documented: it has provided a degree of industrial democracy for the
unionized work force; limited arbitrary discipline and management actions on the
shop floor; improved the living standards and well-being of millions of Americas,
both directly and through its indirect "ripple" effect; and much more.'
However, collective bargaining has not effectively influenced the management
and direction of the American enterprise. Part of this has been related to the
philosophy of American management and labor representatives; 2 part to legal limita-
tions which have hampered movements in this direction;3 and part to the low percent-
age of the unionized and the represented work force.' These limitations have caused
some to explore the possibility of co-determination and work councils among
unorganized workers,5 and have caused others to reject the collective bargaining
model altogether as a barrier which keeps the work force from marshalling its full
strength to establish worker-controlled industries., In the last decade, however,
American companies and unions have been experimenting with an increased degree
of worker participation in the management of the enterprise. A variety of reasons
explains such developments, including:
tThis Article has been modified from an address presented at the 1985 Russell Dunbar Labor
Law Lecture, West Virginia University College of Law. © All rights reserved. Robert B. Moberly.
*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., 1963, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1966, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin.
For recent discussions of the value of collective bargaining, see, e.g., Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers' Rights to Self-organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. Rv. 1769, 1822-27 (1983);
Getman, The Courts and Collective Bargaining, 59 Cm.-KENT L. Rav. 969 (1983); and R. FREEMAN
& J. MEDOF, WHAT Do UlNoNs Do? 246-51 (1984).
2 M. DERBER, THE AmiticAN IDEA OF INDUsTRIAL DEMocRAcy 1865-1965, 457-58 (1970).
See discussion in Part III, infra.
A survey conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs showed union membership in 1982 dropped
below 20 million members in the United States for the first time since 1968; only 19.8 million U.S.
workers were union members. The survey also showed that organized labor's share of the civilian work
force was a new modern-era low of 17.9% in 1982, and that unions represented about 27% of those
eligible for membership. 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 81 (1984).
' Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials,
4 J. Comp. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155 (1982); Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled
Promise, 28 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 37 (1979).
See, e.g., Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American
Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). But see, Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. Rv.
23 (1984).
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1) Increased foreign competition, technological changes, and increased
domestic competition caused in part by deregulation, have forced companies and
unions to look for better ways to improve productivity and quality at a better price,
while also improving conditions of work. In this effort, companies and unions have
looked to labor relations and management techniques employed by successful
competitors abroad, especially to Japan and West Germany. Most of the develop-
ing solutions, however, have grown out of the American experience.
2) Since World War II, the American work force has become increasingly
better educated, and American managerial and union theorists and practitioners
have focused on how the ability, education and experience of workers can better
be utilized to improve the prospects of success for both the company and its workers.
3) In the last decade in particular, there has been greater emphasis on providing
a more humane working environment in which employees achieve greater work
satisfaction, and therefore life satisfaction, as a result of their jobs.
This discussion will first focus on the developing forms of worker participa-
tion, including (1) placement of workers on boards of directors, (2) worker owner-
ship, and (3) quality of work life programs, which include work organization
methods (such as quality circles) and profit-sharing and productivity gain-sharing
plans. Following that, the discussion will conclude with how the legal structure
for collective bargaining in the United States could hamper the development of
worker participation to the detriment of companies, unions, workers and the public
in the United States.
II. DEVELOPING FoRMs OF WORKER PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA
A. Workers on Company Boards of Directors
In 1979 the Chrysler Corporation, in gieat financial distress, asked the Presi-
dent of the United Auto Workers, Douglas Frazier, to serve on its Board of Direc-
tors. After some initial reluctance, Mr. Frazier agreed to do so. At the time, many
considered this to be a unique situation, not likely to create a pattern in American
labor relations. Some also questioned whether having one union member on the
Board of Directors would make much of an impact on corporation policy. NBC-TV
created a special on Lee Iacocca, the president of Chrysler Corporation, in which
there appeared an exchange among the Chrysler directors. The condescending manner
with which Mr. Iacocca treated Mr. Frazier in that exchange, and the sight of one
union member arrayed against a dozen or more other directors, lent weight to this
perspective. However, Mr. Frazier, whose term expired in early 1985, believed his
experience was constructive, informative and useful to the UAW members at
Chrysler, as well as to the corporation. 7 The Chrysler local union leadership also
' 116 LAB. REL. REp. (BNA) 92 (1984).
[Vol. 87
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voted to urge that the principle of union participation on the Chrysler Board be
continued.' In recent interviews, 9 Frazier indicated that he still strongly supports
the concept. He said that he received all the information necessary to be fully in-
formed, and when a report failed to provide the backup material that he wanted,
it was swiftly provided upon his request. He resolved potential conflict questions
by abstaining from consideration of collective bargaining plans and tactics, as well
as refraining from discussion of a 1982 UAW strike against Chrysler that began
in Canada. However, he mentioned several instances where he engaged in vigorous
debate within the Board on issues of very great importance to his members, such
as plant closings, supervisor-employee ratios, and employee stock-option and profit-
sharing plans. The decisions on some of these issues, as will be discussed later,
would not normally be subject to mandatory collective bargaining under existing law.
The Chrysler situation was not a fluke. Other companies have since agreed
to worker participation on their company boards, although the phenomenon has
been mostly limited to companies in severe financial distress due to foreign
competition or deregulation, such as the airline, trucking and steel industries. In
the airline industry, six airlines now have worker representatives on the board of
directors as a result of the collective bargaining process.'" In 1981, Pan American
Airlines was the first airline to agree to such an arrangement." More recently,
Eastern Airlines and its unions agreed on what appears to be the most comprehen-
sive arrangement for worker participation on a board of directors.
Eastern is one of the nation's largest airlines, with almost 38,000 employees,
divided into machinists, pilots, flight attendants, and nonunion workers. The
company was in significant financial danger, having lost about 75 million dollars
in 198212 and 128 million dollars from January through September of 1983. ' Because
of this, employees agreed to take a one year pay cut of approximately eighteen
percent in return for stock worth approximately twenty-five percent of the company
and the right to designate four members for appointment to the company's nine-
teen member board of directors, one from each of the four major employee groups."
There are several other elements to these agreements:
1) Union Choice of Director. Management agreed to support the unions'
nominations for director, thereby making it clear that the choice of the represen-
'Id.
9Id.
,0 Developments, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, December 1983, at 4.
1 Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised by ESOPS,
TRASOPS, Stock Purchases and Cooperatives, 1982 Wis. L. Rv. 729, 778.
,Z N.Y. Times, May 11, 1983, at DI, col. 4.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
" The agreements are contained as appendices to the Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Proxy Statement
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tative resides with the unions and not management. This differs from the Chrysler
situation, where Chrysler maintained that the director is still selected by manage-
ment, and in fact a question existed as to whether Owen Bieber, the successor to
Doug Frazier, would be selected to serve on the Chrysler Board."5
2) Director Representing Non-Union Employees. One of the directors is
selected by employees not represented by any union, thereby addressing the concern
of some that unrepresented employees as well as union employees be represented
at the board of directors level.'
6
3) Union Participation in Business Decisions. The agreements established a
plan to allow the employee groups to review, comment and make suggestions about
issues regarding business plans and major capital expenditures, and for union
participation with the company in the construction of new facilities, the remodel-
ing of existing ones, and in the development of such new designs and plans. The
agreement stated that the intent "is to encourage the participation of employee
groups in the development of business strategies and major investments."' 7 In call-
ing for such extensive employee and union participation in decisions concerning
items which normally would not be considered mandatory subjects of bargaining,
the collective bargaining process in this relationship is moving faster than, and
perhaps in an opposite direction from, the law of collective bargaining.
The parties further agreed that if the unions feel a proposed decision is not
in the best overall interest of Eastern, "they will appear before the Board of Direc-
tors to register their dissent prior to the decision of the Board on those decisions
requiring board approval. The Board minutes shall reflect the specific dissent position
and rationale presented by the Union."' 8
4) Productivity Improvement, Employee Involvement, and Job Security.
Provisions were made to establish a five percent improvement in productivity as
well as an extensive employee involvement program. No jobs are to be lost due
to improvements in productivity."
5) Full Information. The plan calls for unlimited union access to financial
data, a provision which cannot be over-emphasized in discussing the establishment
of the Eastern plan. The president of one of the unions, the Machinists Union,
previously had expressed skepticism toward the notion of workers participating on
boards of directors.2 0 However, after Eastern agreed to independent audits of its
financial condition and was fully cooperative in providing the information desired
116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 92 (1984).
16 Summers, supra note 5, at 161.
" Eastern Air Lines Proxy statement, supra note 14, at C-3, D-4, E-3.
Is Id.
19 Id.
10 Summers, supra note 5, at 155.
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by the union, and after the union obtained the right to participate in future business
decisions, the Machinists Union and the other unions agreed to a settlement designed
to keep the company in business.
The Eastern plan was implemented in 1984, and so the result of these efforts
are not yet known. However, it was estimated that during 1984 the agreement would
save 330 million dollars in wages and yield 87 million dollars in productivity gains.2 '
Of course, the outcome will be dependent partly on the success of the airline industry
as a whole, as well as on any agreement negotiated between Eastern and its employee
groups. However, the features described will, at a minimum, set a precedent for
companies and unions which might consider such plans in the future.
Will employee membership on company boards of directors become part of
the mainstream in American industrial life? Professor Summers, in a 1982 article,
set out a theoretical basis by which employee representation on boards might be
integrated, by statute, into the American industrial relations system, taking into
account our own social, political, and economic traditions.2" But even if no statute
is adopted, it appears that unions will demand and, in some cases, obtain represen-
tation on boards of directors. With respect to legal issues, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's (NLRB) General Counsel sustained Douglas Frazier's appointment
to the Chrysler board, stating that there was no unlawful conflict of interest or
employer domination, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has likewise sus-
tained the arrangement under antitrust laws. 3 While all of the legal questions under
corporate law, antitrust law, and the Landrum-Griffith Act have not been
answered,2 ' it appears that there will be continuing experimentation with this form
of worker participation in the United States. In fact, to the extent that courts have
circumscribed the subjects of collective bargaining and access to information under
the National Labor Relations Act, union leadership may find it more and more
necessary to resort to this demand in order to obtain information and input they
find necessary to effectively represent their members.
B. Worker Ownership
Americans have previously experimented with worker ownership. The move-
ment began with cooperatives,25 but in the last decade there has been substantial
11 N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1983, at Al, col. 4.
22 Summers, supra note 5, at 161.
21 For discussions of these and other legal issues, see Goldman, Worker Participation in Deci-
sions Within Undertakings (Nat'l Report, U.S.A.), 1 PROC. OF THE TENTH INT'L CONGRESS OF THE
INT'L SOC'Y FOR LAB. L. AND SOCIAL SEC. 406, 415 (1984); Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor
Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 633, 683 (1983); see also W. GOULD,
JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AmERacAN LABOR LAW 97 (1984); Olson, supra note 11, at 780.
24 Olson, supra note 11, at 780.
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support for employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs). The charge has been led by
Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, an acknowledged master of the tax code. Senator
Long and other supporters promote employee ownership to:
1) foster economic democracy within the private sector;
2) increase productivity; and
3) create a more equitable distribution of wealth by giving employees a share
of the capital assets of this country.
26
Since 1974, Congress has created a formidable array of tax and other incen-
tives to encourage the formation of employee ownership, participation in, and,
in some cases control of, businesses. The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 19741 created a formal structure for Employee Stock Ownership Plans,
ESOPs. That act provided ESOPs with exemptions from certain requirements ap-
plicable to other benefit plans such as pensions and profit-sharing; it provided ESOPs
with unique authority among employee benefit plans to borrow money, along with
requiring ESOPs to invest primarily in employer securities; and it provided that
contributions are tax deductible. In 1975, Congress created the Tax Reduction Act
Stock Ownership Plan, TRASOP. 8 This plan provided that companies could get
an additional one percent credit over and above the ten percent investment tax
credit if an amount equal to at least one percent of the qualifying investment was
contributed to an ESOP which met the requirements of the Act, including immediate
vesting and allocation according to salary. Congress included in the Revenue Act
of 19789 a provision that allowed the employer an additional one-half percent credit
if an employee contribution equal to one-half percent of the qualifying investment
was matched by the employer. The Revenue Act of 197830 made voting rights man-
datory. For publicly traded companies, plan participants must be able to vote all
their allocated shares and, in closely held companies, votes must be passed through
on issues which by state law or corporate charter require more than a majority
vote. In 1980, as part of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act, 3 Congress required
Chrysler to establish an ESOP and contribute to it 162.5 million dollars in Chrysler
stock over a four year period. Significant changes were also made as a part of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 .32 The TRASOP was replaced with the
Payroll-Based Credit for Establishing Employee Ownership Plan (PAYSOP).
26 See, e.g. Address by Senator Russell Long, Employee Ownership and Better Labor-Management
Relations, Second National Labor-Management Conference (June 6, 1984).
" Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. I, §2, 88 Stat. 829, 832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1974)).
26 Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301, 89 Stat. 26, 36 (1975).
29 Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 141, 92 Stat. 2763, 2787 (1978).
30 Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 143, 92 Stat. 2763, 2796 (1978).
2, Pub. L. No. 96-185, § 7, 93 Stat. 1324, 1330 (1980).
" Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 331, 95 Stat. 172, 289 (1981).
[Vol. 87
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Under the PAYSOP, a company receives a tax credit equal to one-half percent
of payroll for contributions to a PAYSOP of at least that amount in 1983 and
1984. In 1985-1987, the credit increases to .75 percent. The Act also calls for im-
mediate vesting, a prohibition against providing more than one-third of the benefits
to officers, ten percent shareholders, or highly compensated employees. The new
law also allowed all of the interest portion of the contribution and an amount up
to twenty-five percent of payroll for the principal portion to be deducted. In addi-
tion, the Act required ESOPs to offer employees the right to demand the company
buy back their stock at fair market value where the stock is not publicly traded
and allowed companies whose stock is substantially owned by employees to require
that departing employees sell their stock back to the company at fair market value
(so as to retain employee control). In the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act Amend-
ments of 1983,1 3 Congress provided that preference under the Act with respect to
loans, loan-guarantees, and technical assistance to firms adversely affected by foreign
competition, will be given to companies which channel at least twenty-five percent
of any assistance through an ESOP.
State laws have also recently have been passed to encourage employee-owned
businesses. In California, a 1982 law34 declares that the policy of the state is to
encourage employee ownership, and the Employee Ownership Act of 19833s requires
the State Department of Economic and Business Development to assist employee
buy-outs by providing revenue bond based financing for the purchase of a plant,
permitting the continuation of unemployment benefits while buy-out negotiations
continue, and making state employment training funds eligible for state training
money. Last year New York directed its Department of Commerce to assist
employee-owned enterprises in various ways, 36 including the issuance of bonds to
help finance employee buyouts at rates below prime. 37 Other states with new laws
encouraging employee ownership include Illinois,38 Michigan, 39 Delaware,4"
11 Pub. L. No. 98-120, 97 Stat. 809 (1983).
3, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 8244 (West).
11 Employee Ownership Act, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5347 (West).
36 1983 N.Y. Laws 1476 (McKinney).
37 Id.
3S Employee Ownership Assistance Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48 §§ 1303-1313 (Smith-Hurd 1984-1985)
(This is an act allowing the Illinois Department of Commerce to grant state loans to encourage employee
takeover and ownership of closing industrial plants. To qualify, the firm must be 60% employee owned
and employees must be allowed to vote their shares.).
9 MICH. Coiri. LAws ANN. § 450.751 (West 1984) (This is an act which aids employees in con-
ducting feasibility studies, negotiating buyouts, and locating technical and financial assistance. The Act
does not provide for loans or other financial aid. To qualify, the purchase plan must have at least
a majority of employee owners with full voting rights.).
"' Delaware Employee Ownership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6508 (1981) (requires state
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Maryland,"' Massachusetts, 2 New Hampshire, 3 and New Jersey." Several of the
states, such as New York"' and Illinois, 6 require assisted companies to be owned
and controlled by a majority of the employees.
Certain 1984 tax provisions will help boost the ESOP concept further. They
provide for deduction of the cost of dividends ESOPs pay to employees, taxing
only half of the interest income for banks that loan money to firms to set up ESOPs,
and allow ESOPs to assume liability for state taxes in exchange for stock. 7
All of this legislation has had its desired effect. There are now over 6,000
employee-ownership plans in the United States. 48 As of May, 1984, there were at
least 600 companies in which a majority of the stock is owned by a majority of
their employees who have full voting rights,4 more than double the number of
such plans only three years ago.
There are several reasons for creating an ESOP plan. One reason is to provide
employees an additional fringe benefit. For example, the Lowes Company, which
operates mostly in the South, has been contributing stock regularly so that the
"' MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 Art. 41, § 14J (Repl. Vol. 1982) (This is an act declaring broadened
ownership of capital an important state policy and finding that ESOPs are an important means of
achieving that goal. The Act requires various state agencies to report on what steps they have taken
to encourage broadened ownership.); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1984 Supp.) (an
act exempting sales of stock to an ESOP from Maryland state securities registration requirements);
MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-902 (1984 Supp.) (amendments to Maryland Corporate Takeover
Statutes allowing the State Securities Commissioner to require notice to employees of takeover efforts);
MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 Art. 81, § 8 (1984 Supp.) (an act allowing utilities to keep tax credits received
by forming ESOPs rather than passing the credits to consumers).
41 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 40 (Michie/Law, Co-op. 1983).
43 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 162-L:2 (1983) (an act creating a community development finance
authority which promotes ESOPs by providing technical assistance and loans).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27 H-90 (West 1984-85 Supp.) (authorizes New Jersey Commissioner
of Commerce to disseminate information on ESOPs to employees).
" See supra note 36.
46 See supra note 38.
, Senator Long's proposals passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984. The legislation in-
cludes: 1) tax-free rollover of the proceeds from the sale of a business to employees where the proceeds
are reinvested in another business within one year and at least 30% of the employer securities are held
by an ESOP or Co-op, I.R.C. § 1042 (1984); 2) deductions for cash dividends paid currently to employees
holding ESOP stock, I.R.C. § 404 (1984); 3) provisions allowing commercial lenders to exclude from
income 50% of interest received on loans to ESOP companies, I.R.C. § 133 (1984); 4) provisions allow-
ing an ESOP to assume liability for estate taxes, provided the sponsor company guarantees payment
of the taxes over an extended schedule, I.R.C. § 2210 (1984); and 5) a freeze in the scheduled increase
in tax credit available for ESOP contributions at 0.5% through 1987, I.R.C. § 41 (1984).
41 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: A LEGISLATIvE GUIDE
TO EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 2 (1984).
, C. Rosen, Speech at the National Labor-Management Conference 4 (June 5, 1984) (available
from the National Center for Employee Ownership).
[Vol. 87
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employees now own twenty-five percent of the company and people who leave might
have amounts in six figures or more."0 In the sale of U.S. News and World Report,
whose employees held most of the company stock, long time employees, including
a chauffeur and a clerk, will collect $400,000 or more.'
Another reason for creating an ESOP is to allow employees to purchase the
stock of an owner who might be retiring or otherwise leaving the company, without
liquidating the firm for a cash value or selling to someone who wouldn't continue
the business in the same way that its founder did.1
2
A third reason for creating on ESOP is to borrow money, since an ESOP allows
the company to borrow through the ESOP fund and thus be able to deduct the
principal as well as the interest parts of the ESOP loan. In borrowing from an
ESOP a company can borrow money less expensively, and the same dollars used
to raise new capital are being used to fund an employee benefit plan.1
3
The most publicized use of an employee ownership plan is where employees
of a failing company, take wage concessions or buy the company outright. It has
been estimated that there are between 100 to 120 such cases, about two percent
of the total number of employee ownership plans in the United States.14 Although
this is a fairly small percentage, these are important examples, because the com-
panies tend to be quite large and they involve saving jobs. There have been about
60 outright employee buyouts for the purpose of saving jobs since 1971"1 and about
55 of them are still in business as a result of having been able to turn around the
business, 6 including some dramatic turnarounds. Weirton Steel, a large West
Virginia steel manufacturer that recently became employee-owned, declared its first
quarterly profits in two years.7 Hyatt Clark Industries in New Jersey employed
800 workers when the buyout was completed and now employs 1530 workers. 8
Employees now own or are scheduled to own fifteen percent or more of the stock
in at least six airlines.59
Being employee-owned does not immunize a company from the adverse
influences of the market place, however. Rath Packing Company, another well
:0 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSiP, supra note 48, at 8.
' How to Plan to Repurchase Stock from Departing Employees, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, June,
1984, at 4.
11 C. Rosen, supra note 49, at 6.
:3 Id. at 7.
4 Id.
5I id. at 8.
56 Id.
" Developments, supra note 10.
" NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 6.
S Developments, supra note 10, at 6.
1985]
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known buyout situation, entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings due primarily
to adverse market conditions.
60
Many union leaders are taking Senator Long's advice to ask for employee stock
ownership as a part of the negotiation process. A recent report in the Harvard
Business Review stated that thirty-five percent of the collective bargaining agreements
studied which involved wage concessions also involved providing at least some stock
ownership to employees. 6' In addition to the auto and airline industries, three of
the major trucking lines have offered employees close to half of their stock in return
for wage concessions.62 U.S. Sugar, the nation's largest sugar company, has set
up an ESOP in which workers will own about forty-seven percent of the firm.
6
Of course employee ownership does not necessarily mean employee direction.
However, the Congress and state legislative bodies, as well as unions and employees,
are becoming more sophisticated concerning employee control under such
circumstances. Framers of such plans now give careful attention to the passing
through of votes to the employees themselves or to an employee or union trust,
or, as in the Weirton Steel plan, providing employees with a vote on a one person,
one vote basis on most issues, even though stock is allocated according to relative
pay." For example, the Atlas Chain Company, organized by the United Auto
Workers, was faced with closure in 1982.6s The UAW began examining the possibility
of a buyout, but demanded worker control as well as worker. ownership. The union
was able to gain control with four members of the seven member board of directors. 6
Although it has not normally been possible for unions to gain majority control,
the union very often is able to obtain some representation on the board of directors
along with worker ownership and control of stock.
Much more research is necessary with respect to the impact of employee owner-
ship and control on worker satisfaction, productivity, worker involvement on the
job, pay equity, pay satisfaction, job security, and the like. A 1978 study published
by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center' 7 found that companies with
employee stock option plans were 150 percent as profitable as comparable conven-
tional companies without them. A 1980 study reported in the Journal of Corpora-
tion Law68 found that employee ownership companies had twice the average annual
productivity rate between 1975 and 1979 of comparable conventional companies
60 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 12.
Mills, When Employees Make Concessions HAgv. Bus. REv. 103 (May-June, 1983).
62 Developments, supra note 10.
63 Id. at 5.
64 Id. at 4.
61 1 EMPLOYEE REL. WEEKLY, 451 (1984).
66 Id.
67 M. CONTI & A. TANNEHAUM, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1980).
63 Marsh & McCallister, ESOPS Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans, 6 J. CORP. L. 551 (1981).
[Vol. 87
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studied. A 1983 study 9 found that majority employee-owned companies generated
three times more net new jobs than comparable conventional companies. These
preliminary studies, as well as the increasing popularity of such plans, indicate that
stock ownership plans may be a significant factor in increasing worker participa-
tion in America. However, further studies are necessary.
C. Other Forms of Worker Participation: Quality of Work Life Programs,
Quality Circles, Productivity Gain Sharing and Profit Sharing
1. Quality of Work Life Programs
Over the last decade a variety of joint efforts between employers and unions,
at both the company and shop floor level have come to be known as "quality
of work life" programs." These programs have been aimed at restructuring the
work place to provide for greater worker satisfaction, greater participation in deci-
sionmaking on the job, constructive interaction with fellow workers, and improved
organizational performance and quality. A good example of a company-level effort
is described in the agreement between AT&T and the Communication Workers of
America establishing a quality of work life program. 7' This agreement contains
the following principles which have generally come to be associated with the quality
of work life movement:
1) Goals. The agreement states that "the essential component of a Quality
of Work Life (QWL) effort is a process which increases employee participation
in the decisions which affect their daily work and the quality of their work life." '72
It states that the goals of quality of work life efforts are "to employ people in
a profitable and efficient enterprise, ' 3 and "to create working conditions which
are fulfilling by providing opportunities for employees and groups at all levels to
influence their working environment." 7 ' It stresses "the basic human values of
security, fairness, participation and individual development."1 5 It states as a basic
tenant of QWL that "employees are responsible, trustworthy, and capable of mak-
ing contributions when equipped with the necessary information and training,''76
11 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYMENT OWNERSHIP, CHARACTERISTICS AND EMPLOYMENT PERFOR-
MANCE OF MAORrrY EMPLOYEE OWNED COMPANIES 6 (1983).
"e See generally, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, MANAGEMENT-LABOR COOPERATION IN QUALI-
TY OF WoRKLUIE EXPERIMENTS: COiPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EIGHT CASES (1984) (a technical report to
the U.S. Department of Labor examining Quality of Worklife Programs over the last 11 years) [hereinafter
cited as INSTITUTE].
7, Reprinted in pertinent part in I. SIEGAL AND E. WEINBERG, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERA-
TION: Tm AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 276 (1982).
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and that the parties seek to develop the potential of all employees. 7
2) Information. The parties also commit themselves to provide the necessary
information to insure the success of the quality of work life programs .7 The necessity
to share in the fullest range of information is an element which commentators,
unions, and employers have all acknowledged to be a critical feature of a successful
quality of work life program."9
An American Can Company vice-president, talking about such a program with
the Steelworkers Union, said "a key to the relationship is an almost complete sharing
of information." '80 He stated "we give the union any piece of information it
wants,"'" stating that such openness makes bargaining easier.82
3) Supplement, Not Substitute, for Collective Bargaining. The AT&T/C.W.A.
agreement provides that QWL efforts must be viewed as a supplement to the
collective bargaining process, and states that "the integrity of the collective bargain-
ing process, the contractual rights of the parties and the working of the grievance
procedure must be upheld and maintained. '8 3 A recent survey of quality of work
life programs indicated that this feature is a common element of QWL programs. 4
4) Job Security. The AT&T agreement provides that "innovations which result
from the QWL process will not result in the layoff of any regular employee or
negatively affect the pay or seniority status of any Union eligible employee, whether
he or she is a participant in the process or not." '8 5
5) Mutual Respect and Trust. The agreement states that "the success of QWL
efforts requires a spirit of mutual respect and trust among employees, management
and the union." '86 Others have also emphasized that QWL works best when there
is no threat to the bargaining relationship, and QWL will not work at all when
the effort is viewed as an attempt to undermine the union. 87 The attitude of union
leaders toward QWL tends to be dependent in part on whether management has
accepted and recognized unions and the collective bargaining process. 8
6) Support and Leadership. The agreement states that the success of QWL
requires continuing support and leadership from management, unions and employees
77 Id.
7 Id. at 281.




8 I. SIaA & E. VEINBERG, supra note 71, at 280.
" INSTITUTE, supra note 70, at 355.
"I. SIa. & E. WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 280.
" Id. at 281.
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at all levels.8 9 Others have also emphasized that the success of such efforts depends
on whether there is solid support both at the leadership level and at the worker level. 90
Today over 1,000 quality of work life plans exist at former Bell system
companies. 9' It is reported that the plans have not been adversely affected by a
three week nation-wide strike or by the breakup of the Bell company. 92
Other major industries with quality of work life programs are the auto and
steel industries.9 3 In the auto industry, provision for such QWL programs have
been established since about 1973.1" General Motors, for example, has about 100
quality of work life programs operating through about 300 committees,95 and the
growth in these programs since their inception in the 1973 contract has been con-
sistently steady in both high profit and no profit times, although not without occa-
sional setbacks in individual plants. 96 Similar programs have been established in
the steel industry under an agreement with the United Steelworkers to establish
Labor-Management Participation Teams (LMPT). These plans have had mixed suc-
cess depending upon the steel company involved.9 7
The federal government is encouraging efforts such as QWL and labor-
management cooperation. On May 1, 1984, the President's Commission on Industiral
Competitiveness (PCIC) issued recommendations which emphasize the need for
greater labor-management cooperation and new collaborative efforts to maximize
productivity through open communication and worker participation.98 In 1984, the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service planned to distribute one million dollars
in funding for labor-management committees under the Labor Management
Cooperation Act of 1978. 91 Committees eligible for funding are those organized
jointly by employers and labor organizations "for the purpose of improving
labor/management relationships, job security, organization effectiveness, enhanc-
ing economic development or involving workers in decisions affecting their job in-
cluding improving communication with respect to subjects of mutual interest and
concern." 0
0
What is the extent of these programs? According to a recent New York Stock
" I. SIEGAL & E. WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 281.
90 INsTrruTE, supra note 70, at 373.
11 Innovative Approach to Collective Bargaining, supra note 79, at 142.
92 Id.
9' INsTrTrrE, supra note 70, at 366.
94 Id.
91 Suspension of Quality of Work-Life Program at GM, 114 LAB. REL. RP. (BNA) 226 (1983).
96 Id.
9, Innovative Approach to Collective Bargaining, supra note 79, at 142.
15 Industrial Competitiveness Commission's Report, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 36 (1984).
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Exchange report entitled "People and Productivity: A Challenge to Corporate
*America," ' fourteen percent of all companies employing one hundred or more
people were involved in some kind of quality of work life effort. This fourteen
percent, however, employed fifty-two percent of the American work force. The
study found a twenty percent increase in productivity as a direct result of the effort.
Will the QWL movement last? Some say yes, arguing that the country has
experienced a permanent economic upheaval which will force companies and unions
to cooperate on a permanent basis for survival. 02 Others argue, however, that
America has always had a checkered history of labor-management cooperation,
with cooperation existing during economic bad times but then disappearing with
economic prosperity.
2. Quality Circles: Worker Participation Groups at the Shop Floor Level
Quality of work life programs often include the establishment of worker par-
ticipation groups at the shop floor level, variously called quality circles, employee
involvement teams, or autonomous work groups. These programs normally have
the dual goals of increasing the quality of output while also improving job satisfac-
tion and productivity. Participation groups vary widely in their power to make
decisions and implement change, but what little evidence exists suggests that their
potential effect depends on the extent to which they assign decision-making respon-
sibility to those closest to the work. A recently completed study of such groups
concluded that:
Participation group processes which are designed to utilize the ideas of those closest
to the work can be expected to have the greatest impact on the quality of employees'
work lives and on the desired organization outcomes. Typically this means turning
over some important decisions to the individuals who do the work.1'0
While the results are mixed with respect to the success of worker participation
groups, Siegel and Weinberg, in their recent work on labor-management coopera-
tion, conclude that:
Companies that have had satisfactory results with quality circles cite monetary and
nonmonetary net gains, direct and indirect. At the end of its first three years of
experience with quality circles, Lockheed estimated that the savings of the program
were about four times the cost of operating it. An attitude survey conducted at
Westinghouse found unanimous support for continuation and extension of the circle
101 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PEOPLE AND PRODUCTIVrITY: A CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA
(1983).
IO Nowak, Worker Participation and its Potential Application in the U.S., 35 LAB. L.J. 148 (1984);
see also WoR.K IN AMRICA INsTIUTE INC., PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH WORK INNOVATIONS 4 (1982).
0' LAWLER & MOmHMAN, QUAITY OF WORK LIFE 33 (1984).
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program. In addition to the accomplishment of their explicit primary purpose, circles
are credited with contributions to higher productivity, better methods of produc-
tion, improved communications and morale, greater safety, fuller utilization of
worker capabilities, and development of leadership skills transferable to other
settings.""o
A study of hospital quality circle programs recently concluded:
In terms of six goals enumerated by the study-improved communications, im-
proved cooperation, employee involvement, improved quality of care, improved
operations and cost containment-the study found that six percent of the hospitals
related neutral results, thirty-eight percent positive results, and fifty-four percent
were very positive results.1°"
Apparently there are several thousand quality circle groups in the United States,
still a small number compared to the 600,000 estimated to exist in Japan. 06
3. Productivity Gain-Sharing and Profit-Sharing
Gain-sharing plans have drawn increasing interest as a means of obtaining greater
worker participation and in sharing economic gains among the workers who helped
produce them." 7 The plans involve measuring labor productivity through a variety
of techniques, and then sharing a bonus based on measured improvements in pro-
ductivity. Typically such programs also include other forms of employee involvement
and cooperation, and they attempt to foster creativity and team work by linking
monetary rewards to increases in the productivity of the entire establishement. The
best known plan was developed by Joe Scanlon, a steel worker and union president,
in the late 1930s. His notion was that collective bargaining could serve as a
framework for reconciling management's desire for increased bargaining could serve
labor's desire for a fair share of the economic benefits resulting from productivity
gains.' ° His gain-sharing plan, as well as newer plans such as Rucker and
Improshare, have been utilized with some success for quite a few years.'0 9 One
report depicts the Scanlon plan as producing the most readily-seen results more
quickly for more employees than many other reforms in work organization. The
authors state:
First, Scanlon Plans do not depend heavily for survival on the continuance on the
job of a single supportive manager, management, or union official, who is subject
to change. Everyone has a visible, measurable stake in its continuation, the monthly
24 I. SIEGAL & E. WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 135.
101 Study of Hospital Quality Circle Programs, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 96 (1984).
06 I. SIEGAL & E. WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 132.
107 LAWLER & MOIMiAN, supra note 103, at 39.
I' 1. SIEGAL & E. WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 180.
See generally, B. GRAHIm-MooRE & T. Ross, PRODucTIvITY GAINSHARING (1983).
1985]
15
Moberly: New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
bonus check. Second, Scanlon Plans are agreed [to] voluntarily by both union and
management outside the contract and must be accepted by a substantial majority
of all employees. Third, as soon as they are adopted, Scanlon Plans reach everyone
from the plant managers to the sweeps."''
Normally, gain-sharing plans utilize a series of committees to consider and
implement employees' suggestions for productivity improvement. A formula is then
agreed to for the return of some portion of gain to the employees in an equitable
manner. A recent study concluded that: "Overall, there is an impressive amount
of evidence attesting to the success of gain-sharing plans. In general, they provide
a foundation for greater employee involvement in the organization-involvement
that is both financial and psychological." ''
Profit-sharing plans are based on employees receiving a fixed percent of the
annual net profits rather than on any relationship to productivity gains. Moreover,
profit-sharing plans do not necessarily involve worker participation either in manage-
ment decisionmaking or in shop floor consultation. Nonetheless, some unions view
profit-sharing as a good method of obtaining a "piece of the equity." The profit-
sharing foundation has estimated that, as of the end of 1980, about 15 million
employees were enrolled in some 380,000 profit-sharing plans." ' 2 In recent years
some unions and companies have negotiated profit-sharing arrangements in return
for union concessions." 3 In 1958, when Walter Reuther proposed a profit-sharing
plan to the auto companies, the companies responded by calling the notion
"extravagant" and "foreign to the concepts of the American free enterprise
system.""' In 1981 and 1982, the big three auto makers agreed to profit-sharing
plans in return for union concessions, and recently payments were made amount-
ing to several hundred dollars per employee. "' Nonetheless, in the last round of
bargaining the profit-sharing arrangement came under attack due to the large bonuses
paid to G.M. and Ford executives." 6 One of the elements necessary for such a
plan to be successful is that the profits be shared equitably. In this situation, workers
understandably tend to discount a few hundred dollars compared, for example,
to the $1.5 million dollars bonus paid to the chief executive of General Motors.
Batt & Weinberg, Labor-Management Cooperation Today, HAuv. Bus. REv., Jan/Feb, 1978
at 102.
LAWLER & MoHRAN, supra note 103, at 44.
I. SIEGAL & E. WEINBERG, supra note 71, at 189.
See, e.g., Long-Term Impact of Concession Bargaining, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 74,75 (1984).
Shaw, Cooperation for Needed Reductions in High Labor Costs, PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y.U. 35TH
ANNuA. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 105, 110 (1983).
' GM Profit Sharing of $322 Million, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 123 (1984); Profit-Sharing
at Ford Motor, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 144 (1984).
" Suspension of Quality of Work-Life Program at GM, supra note 95 at 225.
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III. THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A POSSIBLE IMPEDIMENT TO
WORKER PARTICIPATION
There are several possible impediments to worker participation under the
National Labor Relations Act. However, this discussion will be limited to im-
pediments relating to information disclosure and subjects of bargaining.
A. Information Disclosure
The ability of workers to participate in company decisions will always be limited
so long as they are unable to obtain financial information about the company,
including profits, costs, production figures, and other information concerning an
employer's ability to pay or to operate effectively.
All of the programs for worker participation previously discussed depend for
their success on the sharing of information concerning the company's operation
and financial conditions. Unions are unwilling to agree to wage concessions in return
for membership on boards of directors or stock ownership unless the company
is completely honest and open with respect to its financial condition. Virtually all
of the academic, union, and management representatives commenting on quality
of work life programs also emphasize the importance of information sharing to
achieve organizational and worker goals. Yet the duty to provide information under
the National Labor Relations Act is limited. Unless an employer claims an inability
to pay, there is no duty to divulge financial information such as profits, costs,
sales, and production levels."" The result is that employers simply avoid claiming
an inability to pay, unless they find that the information might be useful to per-
suade the union to make concessions. In requiring financial disclosure the United
States is far behind many foreign competitors. " 8
These information limitations inhibit the development of worker participation
and labor-management cooperation in America. Experience demonstrates that
workers and their representatives are much more likely to cooperate with cost-saving
measures, worker productivity and the like when they have enough information
to allow them to make sensible and intelligent judgments about the condition and
operations of the company. In fact, if the financial and other information available
to union members who serve on company boards of directors was available through
the collective bargaining process, it is likely that unions would be much less interested
in serving on such boards.
"I NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Empire Terminal Warehouse Co.,
151 NLRB, 1359 (1965), aff'd sub nom, Dallas Gen. Drivers Local 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Caster Mold & Machine Co., 148 NLRB 1614 (1964).
1" See, e.g., R. BLnPAIN, Information and Consultation, in ComAsnvE LABOR LAW AND IN-
DUSTRiAL RELATIONS 208 (R. Blanpain ed. 1982).
1985]
17
Moberly: New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
B. Limited Subjects of Bargaining
The Supreme Court's distinction in the Borg-Warner case between mandatory
and permissive subjects of bargaining ' 9 has greatly damaged the cause of worker
participation and labor-management cooperation.
To the extent that the mandatory category does not include items of impor-
tance to employees, and to the extent that employers may make decisions on such
matters without consulting employees, worker participation is diminished. In this
sense, the language contained in First National Maintenance'20 may further diminish
such worker participation. Although the holding of First National Maintenance
is quite narrow, in that it upheld an employer's unilateral termination of its
maintenance contract with a nursing home,' 21 its language clearly creates a stumbl-
ing block to worker participation through collective bargaining. The Court stated
that "Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would
become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the
union's members are employed."' 12  It is not clear how bargaining over matters
affecting member's jobs would make the union an equal decisionmaker since
management still makes the final decisions in the event of a bargaining impasse.
The Court also expressed a clear preference for unilateral managerial decisionmak-
ing rather than collective bargaining when it stated that "[m]anagement must be
free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the
running of a profitable business."'' 25 It also stated:
[I]n view of an employer's need for unemcumbured decisionmaking, bargaining
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availabil-
ity of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor management
relations and the collective bargaining process, outweigh the burden placed on the
conduct of the business.' 2
The Court concluded "that the harm likely to be done to an employer's need
to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for
economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through
the union's participation in making the decision." 125 The Court expressly intimated
no view as to "other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations,
sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc."' 126 The Court also noted
that employees still had the right to bargain over the effects of the shutdown.'2 7
"' NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
20 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
121 Id. at 669.
122 Id. at 676.
2 Id. at 678-79.
224 Id. at 679.
" Id. at 686 n.22.
126 Id.
227 Id. at 681-82.
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However, in a 1984 NLRB decision, United Technologies,'28 the Board seems
to have limited the mandatory subjects of bargaining even further. The actual holding
was that the decision of an employer to consolidate and transfer research and
development functions from one facility to another is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining. However, the main opinion by Chairman Dotson and member Hunter
elaborated on some management decisions not considered in First National
Maintenance. The opinion states that for the reasons given in First National
Maintenance, management's need for predictability, flexibility, speed, secrecy, and
to operate profitably, decisions which "affect the scope, direction, or nature of
the business" are not mandatory subjects of bargaining.' 29 It was further stated
that such decisions include "decisions to sell a business or a part thereof, to dispose
of its assets, to restructure or to consolidate operations, to subcontract, to invest
labor-saving machinery, to change the methods of finance or of sales, advertising,
product design, and all other decisions akin to the foregoing."'
30
If all of these decisions are removed from the arena of collective bargaining,
there is little doubt that collective bargaining as a form of worker participation
has been dealt a severe blow. One can hardly call collective bargaining a strong
participatory device if it can only deal with the effects rather than the business
decisions themselves.
Moreover, the scope of United Technologies is unclear. Does it mean that
management may refuse to bargain, for example, over union demands which would
restrict subcontracting or the restructuring or consolidation of operations, or the
introduction of new technology? A literal reading of the cases which create the
mandatory/permissive distinction, restrict the scope of mandatory bargaining, and
restrict the parties' ability to proceed to impasse on such issues, might suggest such
a result. For example, in First National Maintenance, the Court stated, in dictum,
that labor as well as management may not insist on bargaining a nonmandatory
item to the point of impasse,' even though Borg-Warner, the case creating the
mandatory/permissive distinction, involved an employer which pushed to impasse,
rather than a union. Some lower courts have also held that unions are prohibited
from striking or threatening to strike over nonmandatory subjects of bargaining.'32
"' United Technologies v. NLRB, 115 L.L.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984).
' Id. at 1283.
130 Id.
' First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 675 n.13.
12 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 38, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 575 F.2d 394, 399 (1978), where
a union's threat to strike if interest arbitration was not adopted was found to be unlawful restraint
and coercion, due to the nonmandatory nature of the subject; and Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639
F.2d 545 (1980), where the court held that an "automatic application of contract" clause was nonman-
datory, and that "by striking to achieve agreement on a nonmandatory subject the Union refused to
bargain within the meaning of § 8(b)(3) of the Act."
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In light of these decisions it is difficult to predict the outcome of a case where,
for example, a union engages in a strike to obtain a contract clause which restricts
subcontracting, a common enough subject of bargaining. Most observers thought
that Congress, in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, intended to move
away from judicially-created "unlawful objects" of strikes when it passed Section
13, protecting strikes, and Section 8(b)(4), which established certain impermissable
objects of strikes. Since First National Maintenance did not arise in a strike con-
text, but rather as a result of a union refusal to bargain, it can be argued that
the right of a union to strike should not be dependent upon judicial or administrative
determination of whether the object of bargaining is mandatory or permissive.'"
The Board and courts need to face much more directly the arguments that Section
13 of the NLRA protects such a strike; that Congress, by requiring the parties
to bargain over wages, hours, and conditions of employment, never intended those
words to limit the right to strike; and that the only limitations which Congress
intended were those which it created in Section 8(b)(4) of the Act. These arguments
have never been addressed by any court. Moreover, they might never be made,
since most unions who seek nonmandatory contract provisions mix them with man-
datory items, and simply make no concessions on the mandatory ones unless con-
cessions are given on the nonmandatory.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that First National Maintenance and its progeny
will often foreclose collective bargaining as an effective vehicle for worker par-
ticipation in such important decisions as partial closings, subcontracting, and con-
solidation of operations. Under these circumstances, one should not be surprised
to see more union demands for worker participation on boards of directors in an ef-
fort to participate in such decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Employers and unions, through collective bargaining, are creating new forms
of worker participation through worker representation on boards of directors,
employee stock ownership, and quality of work life programs. These efforts show
the creative capacities of the collective bargaining process, but also reflect some
weaknesses in the law of collective bargaining, especially where tribunals have limited
the duty to provide information and the scope of bargaining. The Board and courts
should consider that to the extent they limit the right of unions to important infor-
mation, and to the extent they remove important subjects from the sco~e of bargain-
ing, they limit the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a tool for industrial
democracy and worker participation. Moreover, these decisions do not mean that
workers will become less interested in such information or participation. Rather,
methods other than collective bargaining will be sought to obtain these ends. There
"I See, e.g., Litvin, Fearful Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and Employer Profitability in
First Nat'l Maintenance, 58 IND. L.J. 433, 463 (1983).
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is little doubt that the demand for forms of worker participation other than collec-
tive bargaining stems in part from adjudicatory determinations which have stripped
the collective bargaining process of the full force and impact which Congress in-
tended it to have. There also is little doubt that if left to its own free and natural
evolution, the collective bargaining process, as opposed to the law of collective
bargaining, would effectively achieve many of the managerial and worker participa-
tion goals now being sought by other methods.
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